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SUPREME COURT
OF THE
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In the matter of the Estate of
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JOHN A. BUNDY,
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RESPONDENr·s BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following statement in brief, coupled with the
Statement of Facts of Appellants, will give to the Court
a broad perspective of the case. Other facts, it is felt,
are more appropriately shown in argument to avoid
repetition.
1
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Subsequent to the death, on June 12, 1946, of Ora
Bundy, a petition for Letters of Administration was
filed, on June 21, 1946, by his widow. On July 8, 1946,
after notice and hearing, she was appointed Administratrix; qualified on such day; and Letters were issued
to her. Thereupon she entered upon the duties of AdIninistratrix, accomplishing those tasks normally performed by an Administratix of an estate, including the
1natters of creditors claims; inventories, for County,
State and Federal purposes; sales of real and personal
property; marshaling of assets; sought family allowance; made partial distributions; made an interium accounting; and on May 16, 1949, she filed her second and
final account and report and petition for final distribution. Extraordinary activities were undertaken during
the proceedings, in liquidating Ora Bundy & Co., a copartnership consisting of decedent, and the three heirs
of this estate, namely the widow, son and daughter of
decedent, resulting in the bringing into the estate of
$61,364.32. The performance of this activity was a nee. essary adjunct to the fulfillment of the primary activity
of administering decedent's estate, and encompassed
the handling of more than 150 · banking transactions,
alone, with inumerable other and varied activities, the
number of which coul~ only be speculated upon.
Throughout the probate .proceedings, efforts were
n1ade to reach an agreement among the heirs, as fron1
the commencement of the proceedings was the intent of
all the heirs, as to mode of distribution encompassing the
distribution of some assets to others, not heirs at law·,
and for distribution to the heirs of the remaining iten1s
of the estate in the kind of property (cash, real estate,
bonds, etc.) desired by each. It appearing finally that
no such agreement could be reached, at that time, a final
distribution, according to law, was sought, but the way
"\vas left open by the prayer of the petition that dis2
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tribution be under the laws of succession, ''or in ·such
la,vful fashion as may be agreed upon by the heirs at
la\v prior to final distribution.'' ( R 159).
The petition therefore came on for hearing May 31,
1949; was continued under order of the Court to J nne
27, 1949, while heirs were negotiating for partial partition incident to distribution, and finally objections to
Accounts of Administratrix and Cross Petition was filed
July 8, 1949, and a copy served on the attorney for Administratrix July 21, 1949.
Hearings 'vere had by the Court ; Findings of Facts,
Conclusions of Law and Decree were made and entered.
The appeal in this case is directed to seven several
points set forth in Appellants' Brief, to which Respondent, rn answer,. says:
STATEMENT OF POINTS
Point 1. Into the possession of Administratrix,
came no furniture belonging to this estate, which has not
been accounted for therein.
la. Appellants' proffer of instrument to attempt to show proof of intention as to ownership was
properly refused.
Point 2. The evidence fully supports the Trial
Court's finding that John A. Bundy has received all his
share of the property of the estate, and he is not entitled
to a further distribution.
Point 3. The administratrix was properly allowed
credit upon her accounting for family allowance.
,
3a. The Order for Family Allowance is valid
and no extrinsic fraud was committed by .Respondent.
3b. The Order for Family Allowance is valid,
and is supported by the pleading and the record.
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3c. The Order of the Court striking Appellant's allegations of fraud, etc., from their objections
was effective and free of error.
3d. The Court, in the exercise of its sound
discretion, properly allowed the credit for family allowance.
Point 4. Administratrix has not delayed closing of
estate beyond August 27, 1947, and the receipt of family
allowance subsequent to partial distribution was proper,
authorized and confirmed.
Point 5. Compensation to the Administratrix was
properly allowed.
5a. The Court properly refused introduction
of evidence of· the claim of Waiver of Administratrix
Commissions.
5b.
misconduct.

Administratrix has been guilty of no

Point 6. The determination by the Court that
$100.00 is the amount chargeable to Administratrix for
a 10 foot strip of real property was proper.
Point 7. Appellants' motion for leave to file out of
time and motion to amend Findings and Decree and their
motion for a new trial, were properly denied by the
Court.
ARGUMENT
Point 1. Into the possession of Administratrix
came no furniture belonging to this estat-e, which has not
been accounted for therein.
At the death of decedent there was furniture at two
places: 1. At a home in Brigham City, owned and titled
in the decedent, and occupied by Jack Bundy; and 2. At
a home in Ogden owned and titled in the widow, and oc4
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.

cupied by the now widow and decedent in his lifefnne.
,~rith

respect to the furniture in Brigham City, it
consisted in part of furntiure purchased by Jack Bundy
originally; some purchased by the decedent; and furniture owned by the widow, loaned for furnishing the
house. The furniture purchased by Jack Bundy was
bought by decedent from Jack Bundy and subsequently .
that furniture was given back to Jack Bundy by
decedent, it was claimed by the Appellants, and although
there was no proof of such gift inter vivos, Administratix acted upon the assumption that such was the fact,
and none of such furniture was deemed to be an asset of
this estate. Appellants at all times were aware of the
position taken by the Administratrix, with respect to this
matter, and no objection was ·heretofore raised.
The position of the Appellants in this matter now
is not clear; and Respondent cannot determine whether
Appellant Dora B. Goddard now contends such furniture
should be a part of the estate of the decedent, contrary
to her prior position that it belonged to Jack Bundy; or
whether Appellant Jack Bundy abondons his prior clailn
of individual ownership and contends now that this furniture belongs to the estate.
If this furniture be determined to be an asset of the
estate rather than an asset of Appellant J aek Bundy individually, Respondent of course, makes no objection,
but states that the non inventory of this asset was by
reason of representations made by Appellants them·
selves.
·The proceeds of sale of the furniture owned by the
decedent have been accounted for in the estate.
The furniture owned by the widow in the Brigham
City house was, of course, not inventoried as a part of
the decedent's estate. · .

5
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With respect to the furniture in the home of the
widow in Ogden, it is apparent that some of the furniture
was owned by decedent prior to his marriage, some by
Respondent prior to her marriage with decedent, some
was purchased by the decedent subsequent to the marriage, some were gifts made by the decendent to his wife
for particular occasions; the bulk of the furniture in the
house at the time of the death of the decedent was purchased betw~en 1940 and 1942. (Tr. 18). The house
was built in 1939. All of these items of furniture were
located in the home and residence of respondent which
home was owned by her and always had been owned by
her. And all items of furniture, fixtures and equipment
of the home ever since 1939 had been in and a part of
Respondent's premises. And all furniture, subsequent
to 1926 when the marriage of decedent and Respondent
was solemnized, had been in use and in the sole custody
and control of decendent and Respondent as man and
wife.
Among such furniture was a grand piano and bench,
(Tr. 14), and constantly Appellant Dora Goddard has
claimed such items of furniture as a gift from her father.
Respondent, while having been uncertain as to whether
or not a gift inter vivos of these items was made to Dora
Goddard, and despite the fact that Dora Goddard was
married in December 1939 (Tr. 12), and lived away from
, Respondents home yet did not assume control of these
'items of furniture, knows, that it was the desire of
decedent that Dora Goddard ultimately have the grand .
piano and bench, and she now has such items. Whether
it is now the contention of Appellant Dora Goddard that
such items as she has were items which belonged to the
estate and should have been inventoried and accounted
for therein, or whether she still contends such items to be
hers individually and not those of the estate, cannot be
determined from her brief. The position of Appellant

6
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Jack Bundy in these n1atters, likewise is not ascertainable and Respondent cannot tell whether he contests
Dora Goddard's claim to individual ownership of said
iteins or agrees with her that there was a gift inter vivos
of these items to her. Repondent, rightfully or wrongfully, has assu1ned that the representations of ownership
were correct and her activities with respect to such ite1ns
were based upon Appellants' representations. In any
event Appellant Jack Bundy contends such items to belong to the estate, such position is unique in as 1nuch as
he has never heretofor so claimed.
It appears on analysis that to make comprehensive
or intelligible whatever the joint appeal of Dora B. Goddard and Jack Bundy on this point, it must be that in
·effect Dora says, the furniture I claim is mine, is mine;
what Jack claims is his, is his: Jack says, the furniture
I claim is mine, is mine; what Dora claims is hers, is hers.
None of this property manifestly should be inventoried
or accounted for in the estate for Respondent has not,
nor does now, claim -to the contrary. Both Appellants
jonitly contend what the widow has and claims in furniture is not hers, but is the property of the estate.
The District Court has held that there was no furniture belonging to this estate which has not been accounted for therein and such holding is amply supported by
evidence, the testimony, and the law.
The following statue from Utah Code Annotated
1943, is helpful in the determination on this point.

'' 101-4-6 HOMESTEAD - EXEMPT PROPERTY
A homestead as provided by section 1, Title
Homesteads, together with all personal property
exempt from execution, shall be wholly exempt from
the payment of the debts of the decedent, and shall
be the absolute property of the surviving husband
or wife and minor children, or of the minor children
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in case there is no surviving husband or wife, or
of the surviving husband or wife in case there are
no minor children, to be set apart on petition and
notice, at any time after the return of the inventory."
(Under scoring ours)
The exemptions from execution are found in the
Code at 104-37-13 and include briefly, chairs, tables and
desks, library musical instruments in actual use in the
family, necessary household, table and kitchen furniture,
sewing machine, pictures, paintings, carpets, etc.
In view of the foregoing facts, and provisions of the
Statutes, the Court's refusal to accept Appellant's Exhibit 1, was not error. Had it been accepted however,
it would have confirmed the intention of decedent that
the widow have the furniture claimed by her. The following is an excertp from said exhibit.
''All furnishings (except the grand piano which
belongs to Dora B. Goddard) is left to my beloved
wife, Lovina R. Bundy.''
Point 2. The evidence fully supports the Trial
Court's finding that John A. Bundy has received all his
share of the property of the estate and he is not entitled
to a further distribution.
The District Court having accidently over heard persons say that Jack Bundy had sold them things; that
those items contained in a little black book owing decendent could be paid off to Jack on a percentage basis
and nothing would be said about it, etc., was impressed
that Jack Bundy may have been doing things which were
detrimental to the estate and to the heirs thereof, and
on its own motion caused a citation to be made requiring
Jack Bundy to appear in Court for examination.

8
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11 pon such exa1nination, it appeared after decedent's
death, .A.ppellant Jack Bundy had taken into custody tires
belonging to the partnership, had sold about $70.00 worth
and had collected nothing, he didn't know how 1nany
tires but the insurance thereon was $28.50; that there
\Yere less than $500.00 'vorth of tires. He had Zerex and
had given it to forn1er Company employees, and to himself to be used the following winter. When quizzed about
a little black book, he stated, "I don't know anything
about the little black book.'' This was a book be_longing
to decedent in which some records were kept of gas, oil,
times, and equipment sold (S Tr.).
The statement of about August 10, 1946, showed he
adnritted collections of $1350.00 and another $400.00; he
had no details to support the collections, he had no record; he had no records with respect to expenses claimed,
except as shown road expense, $650.00 ; miscellaneous
operating expenses, $500.00. He admitted making a statement to the effect that he had promised Hadley that he
would not divulge in Court the fact that Hadley might
know where the book was.
The examination of Jack Bundy, the admissions he
made, convinced the Court that Jack Bundy had collected
money and failed to account for it; had dissipated assets,
the proceeds of which should have reached the estate;
had secreted information of value to the estate. Under
such circumstances, the Court finally ado:r'ted the view
that Jack Bundy had all his share of the estate and perhaps more. (R 206). Jack Bundy nevel appeared personally on the trial of the case.
Respondent urges that a simplified paraphrase of
the situation would be the following:
Jack has collected and retained money belonging to
the estate.
The amounts are best or solely known by him.

9
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He has not disclosed the amounts.
The Court, under the circumstances, concluded that
the amounts at least equaled the amount otherwise distributable to him from the estate.
Certainly the burden of disclosure and accounting
shifted to Jack Bundy and he has done nothing to carry
such burden.
To state the matter in a different way for clarity:
May one keep the benefits of his defaulcations, in
excess of the abilities of others to ascertain the precise
amounts thereof?
The facts of the exact amounts of money Jack Bundy
has collected and retained; the quantities of fuel, oil, gas,
tires, gravel, sand sold or converted, the accounts owing
decedent, the partnership, and in turn the estate, collected or discounted are known to Jack Bundy alone.
Appellant Dora Goddard in her brief says she does
not desire to deprive Jack Bundy of his patrimony. So
says Respondent. Respondent adds that a mothering of
this boy since about 1923 prevents her from seeking the
ultimate redress against him, and has stayed her hand
throughout these proceedings.
The sole questions then on this point are, has Jack
Bundy already received his patrimony, or has he by his
conduct at least, become in no position to object to the
Court's decisions in any respect and in no position to
challenge the Administratrix in any fashion. The Trial
Court has determined both. These affirmatively.

Point 3. The Administratrix was properly allowed
credit upon her accounting for family allowance.
On this point, chronologically, decedent died June 12,
1946, Respondent was appointed and qualified as Ad-

10
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n1inistratrix July 8, 1946, Petition for Ftunily Allowance
filed . .~\ pril ~D, 1947; hearing thereon, and Order of Fixing and Allowing, made and filed May 12, 19±7; First
.A.ccount and Report and Petition for Partial Distribution filed ...\.pril13, 1947, hearing thereon August 25, 1947,
and Order Approving, Allowing and Settling First Ac..
count and Report and Ordering Partial Distribution
1nade and filed ~\.ugust 27, 19-±7; Second and Final Account and Report and Petition for ]j-,inal Distribution
filed ~lay 16, 1949; Objections to Accounts of Administratrix and Cross Petition thereto filed July 8, 1949.
Appellants apparently conceed that here is an order
for family allowance, which, unless it was obtained by
extrinsic fraud or the underlying petition therefore was
insufficient and failed to give to the Court jurisdiction
in the matter, is valid. Appellants' claim this to be a
direct attack upon the order despite the objections filed
in the proceedings are to the accounts of the Administratrix.
Extrinsic fraud as we understand it is:
"25 C. J. page 332
Extrinsic. Being outside of or external to the
nature of an object or case."
And note thereunder (b).
''Extrinsic or collateral fraud'' is ''actual
fraud, such that there is on the part of the person
chargeable with it the malus animus, the mala mens
putting itself in motion and acting in order to take
an undue advantage of some other person for the
purpose of actually and knowingly defrauding him.''
Flood v Templeton 152 Cal 148, 155, 92 P 78, 13
LRANS5797, and other cases cited supporting the

text.
Now what do Appellants' say with respect to the
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evidence to show such :
Mrs. Bundy is step mother of Dora and Jack.
Dora lived in Missouri.
Jack lived out of town. He was not one with any
great capacity for business detail.
Mrs. Bundy was a surviving partner in decedent's
partnership and disqualified to act as Administratrix.
To answer what must clearly appear to be the only
conceivable comment with pertinant merit, Jack and
Dora on June 20, 1946, signed an instrument reading:
''Comes now John A. Bundy and Dora B. Goddard, two of the heirs at law in the above entitled
matter and do hereby recite that they together with
Lovina R. Bundy are the only persons interested in
the above entitled estate and in Ora Bundy and
Company, a co-partnership, and in which partnership Ora Bundy was a member and consent that said
Lovina R. Bundy be appointed administratrix in
the above entitled estate and do hereby waive any
ineligibility she might hav~ by reason of her being
a surviving partner in said co-partnership." (Tr.
25, 26).
Can it be that any of the foregoing be urged by
Appellants as seriously a showing of extrinsic fraud?
Can it be that with Mrs. Bundy being the only possible,
available and capable person surviving to wind up the
partnership and secure to the estate that part distributable to the estate, her act in so doing is one of extrinsic
fraud? The answers are obvious.
·
There is no claim made by Appellants' that Respondent failed, in any respect, to properly wind up said
partnership. Next Appellants' point out that the exercise
of the rights of Respondent as widow seeking family

12
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allo\\~ance

and Respondent a~ Ad1ninistratrix are diaInetrieally opposed. And this is urged as evidence of
extrinsic fraud.
But for those cases in probate where there be either
a corporate adn1inistrator, or executor, and those where
an adininistrator or executor are persons entirely apart
fron1 the fan1ily of the decedent, administrations of
estates are carried on by the surviving spouse in the
1nain. The law recognizes and provides for, and gives
preference to the surviving spouse so to do and the law
does so irrespective of the fact that family allowances
1nay be claimed, hon1estead be claimed, and other rights.
That Res-pondent be widow and claim family allowance,
and claim homestead rights, etc., and Respondent be AdIninistratrix does not point whatsoever to extrinsic fraud,
but Appellants' so urge.
•'Letters of Administration'' R.S.U. 1943
'' 102-4-1. To whom Granted
Administration of the estate of a person dying
in testate mttst be granted to some one or more of
the persons hereinafter mentioned, the relatives of
the deceased being entitled to administer only when
they are enti_tled to succeed to his personal estate
or some portion thereof; and they are, respectively,
entitled thereto in the following order:
(1) The surviving huband or wife".

(Underscoring ours)
"Family Support" R. S. U. 1943
''102-8-1 POSSESSION OF HOMESTEAD
AND EXEMPT PROPERTY DURING ADMINISTRATION''

ALLOWANCE

(Dealing with homestead and family allowance
to suriving spouse)

13
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Next Appellants point to withdrawal of $1,500.00
by Respondent from the assets of the estate for family
allowance December 30, 1946, (R 081). Respondent,
however, invites the Court's attention to refund made by
her to the estate of $1,500.00 on June 21, 1947, (R 080),
and to the account, loans collected $1,500.00 (R 075).
Respondent likewise! invites the Court's attention to disbursements made from the assets of t~e estate to Appellant John A. Bundy and for his benefit in the sums
of $3,000.00, $786.00, $103.15, and $35.00, a total of
$3,924.45, (R 161) less a refund of $635.00 (R 160), a net
of $3,289.45, which sum is chargeable against him as
clearly shows in the Final Account and Report, these too,
without prior Court approval. And further to Appellant John A. Bundy was distributed the title to a truck of
a value of $1,100.00, merely upon her ex parte application
to the Court, without hearing (R 126). This is urged by
Appellants' as and for an added showing of extrinsic
fraudulent conduct on the part of the Administratrix.
Respondent suggests that if this be extrinsic fraud, then
she is guilty of such fraud. She urges, however, that
it is not, and points to the entire record and to the objections thereto and declares that there is no charge or
finding that her records, and accounts are in error, ev~n
of a cent.
Contrary to Appellants' observation, "It is interesting to note that she apparently did not feel the need for
asking the Court for a family allowance until some ten
months after Decedent's death-etc.'' The need therefore clearly appears when an advance loan for family
support in the sum of $1,500.00 was required and an advance from the partnership in the sum of $2,000.00 was
also required. The former sum was repaid to the estate;
the latter sum was deducted from the liquidating
dividend in the Partnership.
Now what are the facts in this case relative to the

14

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

need of the "·idow to support by way of fa1nily allowance.

In 19±6, the inco1ne of the 'vidow as stifulated (Tr
2, 3) 'Yere as follows:
Incon1e fron1 "--ater stock rentals ............$ 40.50
Incon1e fro1n life insurance policy------------ 175.00
Income from ~ ~ G'' Bond interest____________ 25.00
TOTAL·---------------------------------------$240.50
Liquidation of investment in Ora Bundy & Co. produced $1739.19, proceeds of insurance $1017.30. No
income was had from '' E '' bonds, or from her home.
In 19±8 the income of the widow apart from partial
distribution and family allowance was $1382.24 ( Tr 6)
and was from rentals, water stock, partnership liquidation and interest.
The sum received on pa.rtial distributiDn together
\vith sale of her home enabled the widow to procure
housing and enabled the commencement of an income
from such sources by way of rentals from portions of the
house.
It is readily admitted that the widow could have sold
either" E" bonds, ''G" bonds, her water stock, her home,
her furniture and from such sources secured a living,
and after she received her third of the amount distributed to her in partial distribution, this too could have
been used.
Does however the laws of Utah or the cases thereunder contemplate that family allowance is payable only
in the event that the widow have no property whatsoever
which she may sell and dispose of for her lively hood?
We believe that the following excerpts answer this.
In RE: Pugsley's Estate
76 Pac 560
27 u 489
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''The statute was not enacted merely for the
purpose of providing properly for indigent widows
and children during the administration of their
decedents' estates, but for all persons mentioned
therein, regardless of their ability to provide for
themselves out of their own private property. Such
statutes, like homestead and exemption laws, are
enacted because of a benevolent and humane consideration of the helpless condition and distress of
families occasioned by the death of those who had
furnished their support and protection, and they
must be construed with the same spirit of liberality
that prompted their enactment. By the enactment of
such laws the Legislature, under a wise public policy
seeks to guard and protect the family, which constitutes the foundation of the State itself, during the
trying period of affliction and need caused by the
death of the one who directed the family affairs. The
statute under consideration, as will be seen by an
examination of it, does not make dependence on an
allowance a pre-requsite to such an allowance. It
grants to the surviving wife or husband or children
who may constitute the family of the deceased the
use of the homestead and properly exempt from
execution until the court shall otherwise direct, and
then provides that during administration they ''shall
receive such allowance out of the estate as the court
may deem necessary and reasonable for their support.'' The language of the first part of this last
provision is express and mandatory; that of the latter part, discretionary. Upno proper application
absolute ·right; but the amount thereof rests within
therefore, some allowance must be granted as of
the sound descretion of the court, and is not subject
to interference by the appellate court, except in a
case of a clear abuse of discretion. The period for
which an allowance must be granted, under this
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~tatute,

is ··during adntinistration'' of the estate.
And further fron1 the sa1ne case, the Court quote~
'Yith approval fron1

S.A.WYERS HEIRS v SAWYER
2S Ut. 245
"If it had been the purpose of the Legislature
to allo'v n1aintenance only in the case of such widow
and children as were without the means of subsistence in any other mode, it is difficult to conjecture ho'v it occured that the provision should have
been expressed in the general and unlimited manner
it here is. It is incomprehensible that, if the provisin were intended only for the indigent and the
necessitous, i~ should have been made general.''
..~..\.nd

further fro1n the sa1ne case, the Court quotes
with approval from·:
In re Lux

100 Cal. 593
35 Pac. 341
''The allowance is to be sufficient to provide
all the necessaries of life, and this will include all
those things which are reasonable and proper for
use in the home and in social intercourse, in view
of the condition and value of the estate and the
station and surroundings of the family.''
Following the presentation of evidence on the trial
in this case, after those matters of income of the widow,
the payment of family allowance, the receipt of proceeds
of liquidation and all had been testified to, the Judge of
the Court (Tr 109, 110) in effect held that had he had
before him all the evidence, income, financial worth etc.,
as it bears on family allowance adduced in this hearing,
he would have been under the same opinion he now was,
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and would have made the order allowing the same as he
did and had all of these matters been in the original peti..
tion he would have allowed the family allowance as he
did.
The Petition for Family Allowance (R 033), the
Order Fixing Day (R 038), the Notice (R 036), Affidavit
of Mailing and Posting Notices (R 037), and the Order
(R 042) are all in the form and comply with the law and
the practice and proceedure of the District Court in this
Judicial District.
Point 4. Administration has not delayed closing of
estate beyond August 27, 1947, and the receipt of family
allowances subsequent to partial distribution was proper,
was authorized and confirmed.

Argument is made that partial distribution on August 27, 1947, should have resulted in the discontinuance
of family allowance.
At the risk of over simplification, with its admitted
attendant in accuracies, but in order that the real essence of the problem can be viewed, apart from the
"trimmings," if I may be pardoned for a decent into
venculiar, I present for inspection the following:
Decedent died; Widow sought and was granted a
family allowance; in course· of administration she received partial distribution from estate; claimed family
allowance to close of adminstration.
Quries : Does partial distribution terminate family
allowance? ~oes it amount to a fraud that family allowance be paid subsequent to partial distribution?
Responses : A family allowance is provided by law
R.S.U. 1943, 102-8-1; it runs until otherwise directed by
the Court; the order of the court herein provides that it
continue until further order of the Court; until partial
distribution, the widow, to support herself, could have

18

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

sold assets, of ho1ne, furniture, \Vater stock and bonds,
and eould thereafter, have in additiona, used the partial
distribution for her support. She did none of these and
invested the partial distribution in a home and remodeling thereof from whicp subsequently, income began.
The purpose of family allowance is to provide benefit \Yido'v \vith support from husband's estate, comencerate \vith the seale of living at time of death, if estate adequate so to provide, and to do so all during the course of
the adnrinistra tion of his estate unless the court other"~se order. ..A. purpose of administration is to ultimately
turn over assets of decedent to his heirs.
The theory argued for by appellants would, if carried out logically, result in this:
Upon a final distribution, all of those sums paid to
a widow during the course of administration as family
allowance should be deducted from her distributive share
to the extent that her distributive share be adequate to
repay such family allowance payments.
If viewed in another fashion, carried to an obvious
absurdity, the same result in effect sought by appellants
would be for the estate in lieu of ihe payment of a family
allowance, make monthly partial distributions; for if the
estate is solvent, there would never result a contest between creditors and the widow, and if the estate is in
such liquid form as a family allowance could be paid by
the same token it would be in such liquid form as to
permit monthly partial distributions.
Family allowance as are homestead exemptions, and
costs of administrations, have at all times been viewed
as expenses of the entire administration rather than, at
least so far as family allowance and homesteads are concerned, as a pre-payment upon ultimately distributable
shares and interests.
The Courts attention is respectfully called to the
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petition filed whereby partial distribution was sought
and and therein (R 078)
''leaving an apparent surplus of cash at this time
of at least $30,000.00 ~hich should be distributed to
the heirs in order t-hat it may be, by them, put to
productive use.''
(Underscoring ours)
The other principal matter under this point is the
vailed charge, that in effect the Respondent continued
the administration of this estate past the time when it
could or should have been closed with the intent to defraud the other heirs by reason of the continued receipt
.of family allowance.
The Courts inspection of the file will reveal that
rna tters concerning sale of real estate (R 085 etc.) ; conveyance of title to personal property under contract with
decedent (R 098 etc.); Federal"Inheritance Tax matters
(R 105 etc.); release of mortgage (R 118 etc.); consent
to transfer of title (R 126 etc.) ; and State Inheritance
Tax rna tters (R 139 ect.) ; are rna tters carried on in Court
transactions subsequent to partial distribution, and activity insident to all of these matters; and receipts and
disbursements in· addition go for to belie the c~arge
of intent to defraud levied at the Administratrix.
Point 5. Compensation to the Administratrix was
properly allowed.
Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended provides:
''102-11-25. Commissions or Compensation
When no compensation is provided by the will,
or the executor renounces all claim thereto, he must
be allowed commissions upon the amount of estate
accounted for by him, as follows * * * rates set
forth * * * . The same commissions shall be allowed
to administrators. In all cases such further allow20
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ance nulY be n1ade as the court 1nay dee1n just and
reasonable for any extraordinary service, but the
aggiegate an1ount or both co1nmissions and extra
allowance shall not exceed twice the a1nount of the
conunissions above specified. All contracts between
an executor or administrator and an heir, devisee
or legatee for a higher compensation than that allowed by this section shall be void.''
The Court belo,Y, during the course of the hearing,
said; (Tr 104)
•'Now under the circumstances I am inclined to
be of the opinion Mrs. Bundy is not only entitled to
the fees of administratrix - had it been either of
the banks I an1 sure they would have been three
times the administratrix fee in here for extra compensation.' '
The activities of the Administratrix were well known
to the Court; matters concerning its estate being brought
numerous times before it. The court was advised, and
too were the objectors, that the expected estate administration liabilities, as distinguished from the tax liabilities, would amount to $5,000.00 (R 085) and such for the
fees of"the attorney $3023.11, and statutory commissions
of the adn1inistratrix, $1736.56, total $4,759.67, somewhat
less than had been approximated in pleadings of August
1947.
While U.R.C.P. Rule 15 (b) would allow the Court
to permit issues to be heard .and amendments to the
pleadings to be made at the trial, the exercise of such
rule is clearly within the discretion of the court and it
is in no wise mandatory that the court allow amendment.
As a matter of fact testimony was aduced nevertheless
respecting orally claimed waiver of commission (Tr 10)
and such together with the record evidence of performance of activities by the Administratrix and of claim
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for the normal statutory commissions justified the Court
in its finding and decision of the meritorious entitlement of the adminitsratrix to such commissions.
The absence of any showing of fraud, willful default,
gross negligence or misconduct in the administration of
this estate entitling or warrenting the deprivation of the
administratix of statutory commissions is so patient that
respondent submits the matter to this court upon the
basis of he pleadings, testimony, proof and what has elsewhere been said in this brief upon the matter.
Point 6. The determination by the Court that
$100. is the amount chargeable to Administratix for
a 10 foot strip of real property was proper.
As this court is perhaps aware by this time in considering the briefs of council in the m~tter, together with
the pleadings, testimony, and documentary exhibits, for
some time prior to the filing of the final account and
petition, efforts were expanded to consumate a partition
of the estate in harmony with the desires of all heirs. In
that connection Mrs. Bundy proposed to charge herself
$450.00 for a strip or tract of land 10 foot wide lying
adjacent to the property owned by her upon which stood
her home. (Exhibit B) this tract had been appraised by
the estate appraisers at $100.00, by the Utah Inheritance
Tax appraisers at $450.00 and in the Federal Inheritance
Tax inventory it is shown at $100.00. The home did not
stand on -this strip. The truck was distributed exparte
to Jack Bundy, at $1100.00 the estate appraised value
thereof. Throughout all negotiations the estate appraisement was used rather than any other appraisement although inheritance tax appraisements in part differed
from the estate appraisement. Even in the attempted
negotiations respecting partition and distribution such
estate appraisement values were used. except where adjustments figured in stocks and bonds to bring such
values to current condition so that an equality would be
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~stnblished

""here one took eash in lieu of nssPts in an-

other form.
Since the initiation of contest therein the \vidow has
not by pleading or by testimony, or by an intimation of
any sort agreed to be charged in the estate "\\rith $-l-50.00
for this 10 foot strip of land. The land itself while \Yorth
$100.00 is not \vorth in excess thereof when considered
as it was, a vacant tract. It was not an indespensible
adjunct to the 'vidow's land and 'vhile it 'vould be valueless to anyone individually owning but the 10 foot strip,
it \vas of value if added to another and larger tract.
Appellants' council's statement on the matter is perhaps
better than my own when he says:
''While the appraisers in their routine appraiseInent might have felt the value to the estate was only
$100.00 when the land was considered as an isolated ·
10 foot strip, yet when it became legally attached to
the property of the Respondent Administratrix and
was an integral part of a valuable home, its value
\vas obviously increased.''
I cannot believe however that the obviously increased value arising if and when attached to other
property, is the measure of the value of the land when
such land is considered and appraised as a 10 foot strip
\vhich of course is the only value properly which could
be made upon the tract.

The endeavour of the Respondent to lean over backwards in her dealing with the Appellants pri<Jr to contest,
far from showing a "double dealing" as Appellants
council characterizes it, unquestionably sho\vs an attitude
to deal in those matters which effected her personally' in
a manner absolutely free from question.
The Court has charged the widow with the value of
the 10 foot strip as determined liy appraisers duly appointed herein for such purpose. No attack was ever
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n1ade on the inventory and appraisement values. The
deterinination of the District Court in this matter should
be sustained.
Point 7. Appellants' motion for leave to file out of
time and motion to amend findings and Decree and their
motion for a new trial were properly denied by the Court.
The findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the
Decree were made and entered herein April 29, 1950.

The motion to amend findings of fact conclusions of
law and Decree of Final Distribution was served and
filed May 22, 1950.
U.R.C.P. Rule 52 (b) under the title Findings by the
Court, provides in part as follows:
''Amendment. Upon motion of a party made
not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the
court may amend its findings or make additional findings
and may amend the judgment accordingly.''
(underscoring ours)
There can be no enlargement of the time for making
such n1otion under the- following provision:
U.R.C.P. Rule 6 (b)
''Enlargement. Who by these rules or by .a
notice given thereunder or by order of court an act
is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court for causes shown may at any
time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or
notice order the period enlarged if request therefore
is n1ade before the expiration of the period originally
prescribed or as extended by a previous order or
(2) upon motion made after the expiration of the
specified period permit the act to be done where the
failnre to act was the result of excusable neglect;
but it may not extend the time for taking any action
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nnder Rules 23, 50 (b) 52 (b) 59 (b) (d) and
(e)~ 60 (b) and 73 (a) and (g), except to thP rxtent
and under the conditions stated in them.''

(underscoring ours)
.A.nd w·e point out that under the above quoted Ru1e
5~ (b) there are no conditions nor authorizations for
the extension of time nor relief for default, resulting
either from excusable, or non excusable neglect, or at all.
lTnder the provisions of U.R.C.P. Rule 58 A (c) a
judgment is complete and shall be dee1ned entered for all
purposes when the same is signed and filed as herein
above provided.
:Jiotion for new trial was not made and served on or
before the expiration of the 10 day period prescribed by
U.R.C.P. Rule 59 (b).
''A motion for a new trial shall be served out
not later than 10 days after the entry of judgment.''
Actual filing of the motion was May 22, 1950.
There can be no enlargement of the time for making
such 1notion under U.R.C.P. Rule 6 (b) quoted above.
And we point out that under the above quoted Rule
59 (b) there are no conditions nor authorizations for the
extension of time nor relief for default, resulting either
from excusable, or non excusable neglect, or at all.
The motion for order relieving Default and leave to
file motions and for Amendment of Findings and Decree
and motion for New Trial together with affidavit in support thereof are in view of the foregoing, redundant.
It is brought to the attention of the Court that it
was April 24, 1950 when the Court filed its Memorandurn
Decree dated April 22, 1950 and ever since on or about
April 24, 1950, Appellants' council has had a copy of
such Decree as has Respondents' council.
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It is urged that all of said motions were properly
denied by the court after due consideration of them together with the affidavits filed by respective council.
The case of Hill vs. Hews 320 US 520 is not helpful
and is inapt in as much as the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEEDURE are clear an unambiguous in the matters. Had it been the \ntention in Utah to have the comInencement of the running of time to be conditioned upon
the action of the Clerk of this Court the rules could have
readily so provided and we should not attempt to read
in to the rules that which is not presently there, nor to
ereate an ambiguity in the practice of the law \vhere
no ambiguity now subsists.
CONCLUSION
The Respondent has attempted to meet and discuss
those arguments of Appellants, of significance; the arguInents leading out to "fringes" have in most instances
been disregarded; not because they are unanserable, but
because of their diversionary character, and insignifieance. Even thus, this brief is overly long and regretfully repetitious.
The stewardship of the Respondent, upon completion of all her activities in the estate, has suddenly been
attack. To the right of Appellants to attack, Respondent
does not take issue: responsibility for each and every
activity taken by her, she does not seek to evade.
Respondent asks only that this Court review her
activities, and measure her perfomance of the duties of
her trust in the light of the complexities of the activities
and all surrounding circumstances.
The conclusion of Respondent, the conclusion of this
Court sought, is that the Decree· of Final Distribution
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entered below, be confirmed: that the appeal of Appellants, be dismissed. ·
Respectfully submitted, .
David K. Holther
Attorney for Respondent
602 Eccles Building
Ogden, Utah.
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